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SUMMARY OF POSNER'S REPLY TO EQUITY

In its Appellee Brief, Equity Title Insurance Agency, Inc. ("Equity")
argues that it ought to be dismissed because Posner admitted that his real
estate agent instructed Equity to close, and Equity's title agent merely
followed the real estate agent's authorized instructions. Equity also argues
that its title agent Helen Smith breached no duties to Posner when she closed
with the $260,000 Financial Guaranty. None of these arguments provide
this Court with a satisfactory legal basis for upholding the trial court's
dismissal on a motion for summary judgment.
With respect to Equity's arguments on authority, Posner replies that
none of Equity's arguments provide a sufficient legal basis for finding a
delegation of authority. For example, Posner's admission that a conversation
between his agents occurred is not an admission as to its truth. Posner has
consistently maintained that he never told Christoffersen that he approved
the Financial Guarantee, that he never instructed her to tell Helen Smith to
close, and supplied evidence that casts doubt on whether either agent had a
reasonable basis for believing Posner had seen and approved the Guarantee.
Nor are Posner's testimony or affidavits—in which he describes what he
thought his real estate agent did at his closing, or describes his expectations

1

of his agents—sufficient proof of authorization, as evidence of authorization
must show or at least suggest that Posner gave written approval for
Christoffersen to act and speak on his behalf at closing.
With respect to Equity's argument that its agent breached no duty
when she closed with an unsecured $260,000 Financial Guaranty rather than
the secured $263,900 Surety Bond required by Posner's REPC, Posner
answers that a precondition to his sale was that the buyer supply a secured
$263,900 Surety Bond. When Helen Smith closed with a document that did
not specifically match those terms, without Posner's express authorization,
she directly breached the escrow instructions contained in Posner's REPC
and therefore breached her fiduciary duty to Posner.
ARGUMENTS
I.

MR. POSNER'S RECITATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF
OTHER PARTIES IS NOT AN ADMISSION AS TO THE
TRUTH OF THE TESTIMONY
The fact that Posner recites in his pleading "Ms. Christoffersen

informed Ms. Smith that Mr. Posner had approved the Financial Guarantee
written for the amount of $260,000 and stated that Equity could proceed
with the closing" is not an admission as to the truth of the matter. Posner
recites the above conversation based on the deposition testimonies of
Christoffersen and Smith, who both testified the conversation occurred.
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Posner was not present when Christoffersen spoke with Smith—he was in
Florida (R. 327), so his acknowledgement that a conversation occurred does
not reflect personal knowledge. On the contrary, Posner expressly denies
that he "had approved the Financial Guarantee

and stated that Equity

could proceed with closing." (Eq. App. Br. p. 5). Posner never saw the
Financial Guarantee, never told Christoffersen that it was okay to close with
the Financial Guaranty, and never instructed Christoffersen to tell Smith that
he approved closing the sale with the Financial Guarantee. His Appellant
Brief supplies circumstantial evidence that neither agent saw the Guarantee
themselves, and thus knew that Posner had given informed approval
(Affidavits of Posner R 481-486; Facts and Disputed Facts R. 460-465;
Exhibits R 487-545). There is a dispute about what happened just prior to
and at Posner's closing which raises a genuine dispute of material fact that
should have gone to the jury, and therefore Equity's dismissal on its
summary judgment motion is inappropriate.
II.

POSNER'S TESTIMONY IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
OF CHRISTOFFERSEN'S AUTHORITY
Equity cites the following quote, "admitted under oath," as evidence

that Posner gave Christoffersen authority to instruct Equity to close:
Q: Can you just elaborate on what your—what her [Ms. Christoffersen's]
role at closing was? Was there an agreement in place that she would be
contacted?
3

A: The only reason Kandis was at the closing was to get her commission.
And my contact with her as being I guess my agent was to make sure that it
closed. And she was the one that was negotiating back and forth with the
contract as far as making sure that we had a surety bond and how much it
was and everything else.
Equity claims that Posner is bound by this position, having never
modified it, but Posner actually did clarify what he meant:
Q: Michael, I want to clarify something. When you were
speaking.. ..[with Mr. Bennion]...you said you gave instructions to both
Kandis Christoffersen and Helen Smith. I gather you said essentially the
same thing to them, "Make sure a surety bond is in place." Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: But you said you did not expect Kandis Christoffersen to review the
bond in any way:
A: Right.
Posner's first steps in initiating his lawsuit firmly support his denial that
he had made any delegation to Christoffersen. Had Posner actually expected
Christoffersen to accept the Surety Bond on his behalf, and to instruct Equity
to close (Equity App. Br. p. 6), he could have named her in his original
Complaint and alleged a breach of those duties. In fact, at the time he filed
his initial Complaint, Posner was not aware that Christoffersen played any
role at his closing. It was only after Posner received Equity's Answer, in
which it stated that Christoffersen had instructed Smith to close, that Posner
became aware of Christoffersen's actions and amended his complaint.
4

Posner contends that the instruction 'make sure the transaction closes'
offered by Equity as proof of Christoffersen's extended agency, is nothing
more than a general exhortation and certainly a matter that Helen Smith as
escrow and title agent was expected to do anyway. Since Posner gave the
instruction 'make sure the buyer supplies a surety bond' to both agents,
Helen Smith's failure to make sure the buyer provided a surety bond is not
excused by claiming that Kandis Christoffersen gave her instructions that
were inconsistent with Posner's instructions, as Smith had her own fiduciary
duty to Posner.
As Equity states, the truth is not a nose of wax to be twisted and turned,
but in this case, the truth lies in the documented evidence that was created
just prior to and during the time of Posner's closing, such as the listing
agreement, the REPC, the amendments to the REPC, the fax and phone
records of calls made between the parties, the closing documents, and the
Financial Guarantee itself. This evidence shows that Christoffersen did
play a role in Posner's closing, but it was not one that he had delegated.
Under Utah law, a principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf
who represent a seller must have a written agency agreement with the seller
that defines the scope of the agency. Utah Admin. Code Rl 62-6-1(6.1.11.1.)
reads: "A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who represent

5

a seller shall have a written agency agreement with the seller defining the
scope of the agency." The written listing agreement [Posner App. Br.
Addendum 3] between Posner and Coldwell defines the scope of
Christoffersen's agency, and it contains nothing about acting on Posner's
behalf at this closing. l Smith herself stated that she did not believe
Christoffersen was acting on Posner's behalf. (R. 469-471), therefore,
neither the facts nor Posner's testimony support Equity's argument that
Smith closed Posner's sale in the belief that Christoffersen was acting within
her authority as Posner's agent.
III.

POSNER'S REPC WAS MATERIALLY CHANGED

Equity disputes Posner's assertion that his REPC was materially
breached when Smith closed with a $260,000 Financial Guarantee rather
than with the $263,000 Surety Bond the REPC expressly required. (Equity
App.. Br. p. 13-14). Equity suggests 1) that there was no meaningful
difference between a document entitled 'Financial Guarantee' rather than
'Surety Bond', and 2) that the $3,900 discrepancy between what was
submitted and what the REPC required is immaterial because no payments

1

See also U.C.A.§25-5-4(l)(e): The following agreements are void unless the agreement,
or some note or memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be
charged with the agreement.. .every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or
broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation...
6

on the Guarantee were ever made and that failure to pay was not 'caused' by
the $3,900 discrepancy.
Equity argues that there is no real distinction between a financial
guarantee and a surety bond. However, it is clear from the REPC
Addendum 9 (Posner App. Br. Addendum 1), that Posner agreed to the
Seller carry back for $263,900 secured in second position and that a surety
bond would be issued in the amount of the $263,900. (Emphasis added)
Posner made it clear that the surety bond was to be secured. The Financial
Guarantee provided by American Natural Resources Corporation was on its
face an unsecured instrument (Posner App. Br. Addendum 2).
The difference in price between the REPC and the Financial
Guarantee should have put Equity on notice of a fundamental discrepancy
between the two documents. By closing the transaction nevertheless, Equity
effectively changed the terms of Posner's seller financing. The $3,900
change was material because it increased Posner's seller financing to
$263,900; in the event of a buyer default, the Financial Guarantee (even had
it been what Posner requested) would have paid back $260,000, leaving
Posner $3,900 short. Posner agreed to sell based on his expectation that his
seller financing terms guaranteed him receipt in full of the negotiated
purchase price.

7

Acceptance of a document that neither matched the form or substance
of the financial security requested, nor the seller financing amount specified
in the REPC, constituted a material breach.

By closing in breach of the

terms of Posner's REPC, Equity closed on a sale to an unqualified buyer.
The sale to an unqualified buyer, absent the financial protection his REPC
required, left Posner with no choice but to buy back his land when the buyer
defaulted, and thereby directly caused Posner's losses.
SUMMARY OF POSNER'S ANSWER TO COLDWELL
Posner will answer Coldwell's arguments that 1) his conduct met the
requisite legal standards for striking testimony, 2) he failed to marshal the
evidence in support of the trail court's ruling adequately, and 3) that he
cannot prevail at trial without a real estate expert witness. Posner does not
believe Coldwell presented any authority for awarding attorney fees in its
defense of Posner's single claim for tort.

2

A material breach occurs when the failure of performance "defeats the very object of the
contract" or "[is] of such prime importance that the contract would not have been made if
default in that particular had been contemplated" Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591
P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979). See also Rogers v. Relyea, 601 P. 2d 37, 41 (Mont. 1979):
"A substantial or material breach is one which touches the fundamental purposes of the
contract and defeats the object of the parties in making the contract."
3
Under the applicable standard of review, Posner's claim that a breach occurred must be
taken as true for the purposes of this appeal. See Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol, 70 P.3d
72, 75 (Utah 2003): in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, [the reviewing court
must] view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.
8

Correct application of the ruling in Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement,
Inc., 199 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008) demonstrates that Posner's late submission
of his expert report was not a willful failure to obey the Amended
Scheduling Order (hereinafter 'the Order'). Posner demonstrates that in all
but one of the other examples of misconduct Coldwell attributes to him, it
either misstates the record or incompletely summarizes in a way that distorts
Posner's conduct. Posner also contests Coldwell's claim that he failed to
marshal the case against him adequately. Posner is required to cite the
factual findings that support the trial court's orders and conclusions of law
under Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 (a)(9). However, findings of fact
must be supported by sufficient evidence, 918 P.2d 469, 472 Askew v.
Hardman (Utah 1996), and Posner was not obliged to summarize Coldwell's
numerous other allegations of misconduct, as he believes they do not qualify
as facts.4 Finally, Posner disputes Coldwell's characterization of his closing
as so complicated that expert testimony is required as to the standard of care.
ARGUMENTS
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
STRIKING THE EXPERT REPORT

4

See Campbell v. Campbell. 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), citing Woodward v.
Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1991): "...appellants need not engage in a futile
marshalling exercise if they can demonstrate that findings.. .are legally insufficient."
9

Coldwell's motion (R. 1527-1529), memoranda (R.1530-1558; R.
1618-1624) and oral argument (Tr. May 12, 2008) were confined to the
tardiness of Posner's designation of his expert witness Greg Froerer and
their claim of prejudice. Posner's memorandum in opposition (R. 16101617) and oral argument (Tr. May 12, 2008) was also limited to the tardiness
claim and prejudice claim. The trial court rendered its opinion as to the
issues of tardiness and prejudice (Tr. May 13, 2008) and its findings
incorporated Coldwell's Memoranda in the Order (R. 1695-1699).
In its Appellee Brief, however, Coldwell (App. Br. p 5-6) argues that
".. .more importantly, the trial struck Posner's expert witness report and
testimony to sanction Posner's repeated and persistent dilatory conduct in
this case." Coldwell continues by arguing that by allowing Posner's late
designation would be to endorse and legitimize his "persistent refusal to
comply with the Amended Scheduling Order."
There was absolutely no finding by the trial court of any "repeated
and persistent dilatory conduct" and no finding that the reason the expert
witness was excluded was because of such conduct. (R. 1695-1699; R. 15301561; R. 1618-1624). The trial court merely found that the designation of an
expert witness was filed late and Coldwell would be prejudiced by allowing
the expert report and testimony. The only order suggesting dilatory conduct

10

was the trial court's Notice of Order to Show Cause (R 1515), an order
directed at both parties.
To avoid a reversal by this Court and to justify the harsh sanction of
the trial court, Coldwell must demonstrate "willfulness, bad faith or fault."
Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 199 P.3d 957, 967 (Utah 2008).5 As
there was no such finding made by the trial court, Coldwell notes (App. Br.
p. 15) that a lower court's failure "to make a specific finding of willfulness,
bad faith or fault 'is not grounds for reversal if a full understanding of the
issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate court.'"
(Emphasis added) In support of the argument, Coldwell cites Arnica Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah App. 1989) and Preston
& Chambers, P.C. v. Koller, 943 P. 2d 260 (Utah App. 1997).
Arnica and Preston provide us guidance as to the kind of conduct that
merits harsh sanctions. In Arnica, the sanctioned conduct included not
responding to discovery requests for 8 months, and not responding to a
Court ordered motion to compel. The Court, in reviewing the record, found
support for a finding of willfulness, bad faith or fault as demonstrated by
misrepresentation, bribery, intimidation of witnesses, brandishing a revolver,

5

See also Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 276 (Utah 1997) Societe
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commercialese S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 212, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958).
11

etc. (Id.) Similarly, in Preston, the Court upheld sanctions after noting that
the record established the following findings:
During thirty-four months, Preston had served Koller with two
separate sets of interrogatories, sent an informal letter, and deposed Koller,
in each instance requesting the disclosure of potential expert witnesses. Each
request went unanswered. After nearly three years, the trial court ordered
that an expert be retained, imposed a deadline, and expressly stated that the
malpractice claims would be dismissed if Koller did not comply. (Preston, at
263).
Compared to the conduct in Arnica or Preston, Posner's conduct of
filing designation of expert witness Gage Froerer after the discovery
deadline, does not reflect the egregious conduct, in the form of repeated
failures to respond to discovery requests, motions, court orders, bad faith,
and so forth, that Arnica and Preston illustrate as being sufficient to
demonstrate willfulness, bad faith or fault. As pointed out in Kilpatrick at
967, the Constitution limits the power of the courts to dismiss an action
without affording a party an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his
cause (citing Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et
Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2 L.Ed.2d
1255 (1958). The Supreme Court has held that Rule 376 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure "should not be construed to authorize dismissal...
when it has been established that failure to comply has been due to inability,
6

Supreme Court referred to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which are for the most part the
same as Utah's Rule 37 URCP.
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and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner." Societe
Internationale, (Id. at 212). 7 The Tenth Circuit confirmed that the clients1
knowledge was integral to imposing sanctions. M.E.N. Co. v. Control
Fluidics, Inc., 834 F.2d 869, 873 (10th Cir.1987). The sanction of
dismissing Posner's Complaint is a sanction against him personally and he is
entitled to due process under the United States Constitution. Aside from
pointing out that the trial court did not address any willfulness, bad faith or
fault, there is nothing in the Record that establishes Posner's willfulness, bad
faith or fault in filing the expert designation late and Coldwell, in its
marshalling of facts, does not present any such evidence.
As there are no facts to find willfulness, bad faith, fault or even
persistent dilatory conduct, the exclusion of Gage Froerer must be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S SANCTION WAS UNJUST
Coldwell argues (App. Br. p. 16-18) that the sanction was just. The

trial court's power to sanction emanates from the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, namely Rules 16 and 37:
Rule 16(d) states:
"Sanctions. If a party or a party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling
order
, the court, upon motion ...., may make such orders with regard
7

Supreme Court referred to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which are
for the most part the same as Utah's Rule 37 URCP.
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thereto as are just, and among others, any of the orders provided in Rule
37(b)(2)(B),(C),(D)." (Emphasis added)
Rule 37(b)(2) states:
"Sanctions .... If a party fails to obey an order entered under Rule
16(b)..., unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified, the
court in which the action is pending may take such action in regard to the
failure as are just, including the following: (b)(2)(C) strike pleadings or
parts thereof, ....dismiss the action
" (Emphasis added).
Coldwell itself admits that the 12 day tardiness was not enough
justification to sanction Posner. During the hearing on its motion to exclude
Gage Froerer's report, and when addressing the trial court's inquiry,
Coldwell stated, "Again, the reason that this is a material issue is not so
much [the] 12 days. We don't hang people out to dry for 12 days." (Tr.
05/12/ 08: pg 37, lines 21-23) "... it's not a technicality we're seeking to
enforce with this 12-day lapse. It's the fact that all of discovery went by
without mentioning anything ...." (Tr. 05/12/ 08: pg 40 line 25 & pg 41 lines
1-3). The thrust of Coldwell's motion, memorandum in support and oral
argument was that Posner should have designated his expert witness well
before the deadline, not that he was 12 days late. Coldwell itself deemed
that the Order to Mediate (R. 875-879) had amended the Amended
Scheduling Order8, and not only filed its dispositive motion for summary
8

"At the conclusion of fact discovery, and because the scheduling order had been informally
amended by the Court's order to attend mediation, Coldwell Banker filed a dispositive motion ..
it's motion for summary judgment immediately following the mediation .. the unsuccessful
14

judgment [R. 883-1042] 28 days after the Amended Scheduling Order
deadline date of November 13, 2006 [R. 872-874], but noticed Posner for his
deposition after the October 13, 2006 discovery deadline and deposed him
on 11/20/06 [R. 880-882; 1290]. Coldwell also failed to observe the
deadline for objecting to designated experts: that deadline fell 30 days after
Posner's designation deadline [R. 872-874]. It is unjust to allow Coldwell to
rely on an informal amending of the Amended Scheduling Order in making
a filing and taking a deposition after the deadlines imposed in the Amended
Scheduling Order and at the same time where Posner relied on the mediation
order to delay designating his expert witness, to deny him the very same
leeway. Not affording Posner the same consideration raises serious due
process concerns, particularly in light of the severe sanction of dismissing
Posner's Complaint and denying him the opportunity to have his claims
decided upon the merits.
III.

THE RECORD DOES NOT CONTAIN EVIDENCE OF
MISCONDUCT TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S
SANCTION
In this case, the record does not bear out Coldwell's numerous

assertions that Posner showed a persistent refusal to comply with the
Amended Scheduling Order, or that he was repeatedly and persistently
mediation." [05/12/08: Tr. p. 4, lines 3-7] (Emphasis added). Coldwell noted that because of the
mediation "we sat on the summary judgment motion" as its explanation for not filing by the
November 13 '06 deadline. [05/12/08: Tr. p.38, lines 16-22] [R.1620]
15

dilatory. On the contrary, in multiple instances throughout its brief,
Coldwell misstates or incompletely recites the record, as follows:
1. Coldwell claims that "Posner made no mention of any experts
in his responses to Coldwell's interrogatories" and "never supplemented
those responses/' (Coldwell App. Br, p. 5, 8,12,16), but Posner
specifically stated in his interrogatory response that "no final
determination regarding...witnesses" had been made, Posner gave this
reply in his interrogatories, (R.728), and noted it at oral argument (Tr.
5/12/2008: p. 25-26). There is a categorical difference between stating "there
are no experts in this case" and stating "No final determinations regarding
witnesses have been made." The latter response was intended to indicate
that Posner had not yet made a final determination on potential witnesses,
experts included. It was not intended to mislead Coldwell. Indeed, the
record shows that Posner did not even retain Gage Froerer until early
November, 2006 (R. 1685), yet Coldwell cites Posner's failure to mention of
Mr. Froerer in his September interrogatory reply as an example of
misconduct. (Cold. App. Br. p. 5, 15).
2. The formal discovery period for the parties was 6 months, not
the "two years of formal discovery" that Coldwell claims. (Cold. App.
Br. p. 5, 8, 15). Posner motioned to amend his complaint to include

16

Coldwell as a third defendant in December 2004 (R. 119-120), and Coldwell
filed its answer in May of 2005 (R. 608-617). Posner and Coldwell
stipulated to suspend all proceedings between the two parties in June, 2005
(R. 635-637), pending the outcome of Posner's appeal against Equity Title
and Independence Title. The record establishes that formal proceedings did
not resume between Posner and Coldwell until May of 2006, when a
discovery schedule was entered into the record May 2, 2006 (R. 648-652).
Coldwell implies that Posner dallied for two years before designating an
expert, but the record clearly shows that the length of formal discovery
between the parties was approximately 6 months—May-October of 2006.
3. The Amended Scheduling Order did not require Posner to
designate an expert prior to the end of discovery. Coldwell states: "it was
not until after the expiration of.. .fact.. .discovery... and after Coldwell
Banker had filed a cumulative motion for summary judgment that Posner
finally, and belatedly, designated [his expert] (emphasis added). (Cold. App.
Br. P. 5). Coldwell never acknowledges that the Amended Scheduling Order
deadline for designating an expert fell two months after the end of discovery
(R. 723-726). It was reasonable for Posner to observe the Order's separate
date for designating experts, and understand it as valid deadline for
supplementing his discovery response.
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4. The record contains no evidence that Posner's "omission and
concealment of [anl expert witness prejudiced Coldwell and frustrated
the effective management and litigation of the case..." (Cold, App. Br,
p. 16), or that the preparation and costs of Coldwell's first summary
judgment motion were compromised. Coldwell's first summary judgment
motion rests upon the arguments that Equity closed Posner's sale according
to his instructions, that the requirement of a surety bond was satisfied and
the contention that Posner had, in any case, suffered no damages since, as a
result of the sales, as he would reap "enormous profits"(R. 889).9 Neither of
Coldwell's original summary judgment memoranda reference expert witness
issues as Coldwell's defense focused upon the theory that Posner had
suffered no damages [883-885 & 1264-1278].
5. The record does not show misconduct that followed a repeating
pattern, Coldwell alleges that "the trial [court] struck Posner's expert
report and testimony to sanction Posner's repeated and persistent dilatory
conduct in this case.. ..allowing Posner's late designation would have
endorsed and legitimized Posner's persistent refusal to comply with the
Amended Scheduling Order and other basic tenets of formal discovery,
which Posner so often ignored..." and so on. (Emphasis added) (Cold. App.
9

Posner has consistently denied that he made a windfall profit, and argues that in any
case, this is not the correct calculation for damages.
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Br. p. 5-6). In addition to characterizing Posner as a deliberate rule-breaker,
Coldwell alleges sabotage, ambush, deliberate omission and concealment,
and suggested deliberate written and oral misrepresentations.10 (R.1621). Yet
the only factual finding the trial court made was that Posner's expert
designation occurred two weeks late.
Aside from the late expert designation, the record reveals one other
delay: Posner acknowledges that he did not file a certificate of readiness for
trial immediately after Coldwell's first summary judgment motion was
denied in April 2007 [I486]. This is because he was not ready to take the
case to trial financially and there was uncertainty about whether his senior
lawyer, Michael Goldsmith, could continue as counsel. Mr. Goldsmith was
originally retained as an experienced litigator,11 but ultimately withdrew for
health reasons12 and David Ross was hired to replace him in October, 2007
whereby he required time to review the case files. The record shows Mr.
Ross' substitution of counsel notice (R. 1520-1521).

Coldwell's brief suggests that Posner's contention that counsel mailed the expert
designation on December 14 was "dubious", "suspect" and "mysterious."(Coldwell App.
Br. p. 11)
11
This was the first case that the other counsel, Ms. James, had ever taken, and it was
agreed that Posner needed a litigator with some experience.
12
Mr. Goldsmith was diagnosed with a slowly progressing form of Lou Gherig's disease
(ALS) in fall of 2006. Initially uncertain that this was a correct diagnosis, Goldsmith did
not wish to make his illness known; subsequently Goldsmith went public with his
diagnosis as part of an effort to raise research funding,
see:www.nytimes.com/2009/07/05/sports/baseball/05vecsey.html
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While Posner acknowledges he did not contact Coldwell during this
time, neither did Coldwell contact him; Posner took Coldwell's silence as an
assent to the pace at which the case was proceeding.
7. The record contains no evidence of Posner's statements in
mediation. Coldwell states "At no time.. .during the mediation did Posner
reference, allege or represent that he had retained an expert in support of his
claims..." (Cold. App., Br. p. 8); (Tr. 5/12/2008: p. 43-44). As the record
does not contain any information about the mediation, which was
confidential, these allegations are impossible to verify.

io

9. Coldwell alleges that Posner was dilatory and delinquent in
producing discovery documents, but the record does not support this
conclusion, Coldwell's original summary judgment motion made no
complaints about Posner's production of discovery documents and Coldwell
presented evidence in support of its claim that Posner had reaped a windfall
profit. It was only in March of 2008 that Coldwell filed a Motion to Exclude
Documents and Testimony produced after the Expiration of Fact Discovery.
In that memorandum, although Coldwell alleged that Posner failed to
produce documents requested by Coldwell at his deposition on November
13

Circumstantial evidence in the record shows that Posner's expert was retained in early
November and supplied an opinion prior to the mediation (R. 1685). Posner supplied the
mediator with a copy of the expert report, and during mediation, Posner's counsel
allowed the mediator to mention the expert report to Coldwell (Tr 5/12/2008: p. 27).
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20, 2006, it never identified what he failed to produce. Similarly, Coldwell
complained that "even now, Plaintiff produces documents that should have
been produced years ago..." (R. 1567). In fact, the documents to which
Coldwell was referring were created in April through December of 2007 (R.
1606-1607), after the end of discovery. Coldwell alleged that Posner
"consistently and pervasively withheld documents and evidence that
mitigates his purported damages", yet only in a couple of its interrogatories
(Nos. 11-12) or requests for production does Coldwell arguably request that
Posner supply evidence of "mitigation of damages" and Posner responded to
each such interrogatory and request for production of documents, including
indicating that Coldwell could review the legal files of a lawsuit against
Strachan at Posner's attorney's office (R. 727-743).14 Given the fact that
construction on Posner's condominiums continued beyond the end of
discovery, with attendant delays, unanticipated costs and conflicts, Coldwell
might have expected an on-going stream of new information after the formal
end of fact discovery, especially in view of the fact Coldwell Interrogatory
#13 specifically requests an itemization of "costs incurred for any
improvements made to the property" (R. 736).

14

Confounding this issue is the fact that Posner has a different theory of
damages than Coldwell, and Coldwell only requested Posner to supply
evidence to support his damages claim. (R. 1085-1087).
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In conclusion, for the reasons set forth above, the record simply does
not bear out Coldwell's multiple allegations of misconduct and therefore, the
record supports Posner's position that the sanction imposed was unjust.
IV.

POSNER ADEQUATELY MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE
As the Advisory Committee Order on Rule 24 notes: ".. .the

challenger must present in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap
of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings
the appellant resists." (emphasis added), (citing Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida
Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc., 872 P. 2d 1051, 1052-1053 (Utah App.
1994). The appellant is not obliged, however, to marshal evidence that is
not competent, and therefore Posner cited the only factual findings the trial
court made in striking the expert report (5/13/2008: Tr. p.4-5)—the expert
designation was two weeks late, and the trial had already been scheduled.
Posner did not cite the numerous other allegations Coldwell makes because
these allegations have such a tenuous basis in the record that they cannot
properly be construed as facts. See Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635,
638 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995), citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477
(Utah App.1991): "...appellants need not engage in a futile marshalling
exercise if they can demonstrate that findings.. .are legally insufficient."
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V.

EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED
The fiduciary obligations that a real estate agent owes to her principal

include the duties of disclosure, reasonable care and diligence.15 Disclosure
is not complicated, as it can be easily distinguished from failure to disclose:
did Christoffersen tell Posner the buyer supplied a Financial Guarantee or
not? The obligation for written approval of contractual changes is also
easily understood and proven: either there is a signature, or there isn't.
Posner submits that in this case, Christoffersen herself'set a standard
that she then failed to follow: she obtained Posner's signature approving the
change in seller financing amount, $3,900, but, having obtained Posner's
permission to increase his seller financing, she then did not obtain any
written approval of the $260,000 Financial Guarantee, a document that fell
$3,900 of the very seller financing amount Posner had just approved.
Christoffersen's breach of fiduciary duty in this case had to do with simple
omissions: she failed to disclose that the buyer had supplied a document
entitled Financial Guaranty rather than Surety Bond, she failed to obtain a
signature approving that document, even though it departed from the REPC
15

U.A.C.A. R162-6-2. Standards of Practice. 6.2.15.1. Duties of a seller's or lessor's
agent. A principal broker and licensees acting on his behalf who act solely on behalf of
the seller or the lessor owe the seller or the lessor the following fiduciary duties:(a)-(b)
omitted:...(c) Full disclosure, which obligates the agent to tell the seller or lessor all
material information which the agent learns about the buyer or lessee or about the
transaction;.. .and (e) Reasonable care and diligence.
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terms in both title and amount, without obtaining Posner's written
permission, she told Equity to close. In Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d
821, 826 n. 8 (Utah. App.1989), the Court suggested that expert testimony is
necessary when the background field of knowledge involves sophisticated,
specialized knowledge: Expert testimony is required ?f[w]here the average
person has little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or
professions," as in cases involving medical doctors, architects, and
engineers." (Id.) Posner submits that the subject matter of real estate is not
inherently complex, dependent on sophisticated mathematical or scientific
concepts, or beyond the ordinary experience of laypeople in the same sense
that engineering or architecture is. Many jury members, for example, have
undoubtedly bought or sold houses, and this familiarity with the basic
concepts of real estate surely qualifies a reasonable juror to comprehend
Christoffersen's conduct, and assess whether her omissions violated her
basic fiduciary obligations as Posner's real estate agent.
CONCLUSION
As set forth in the preceding arguments, neither Equity nor Coldwell
Banker has provided this Court with a sufficient legal and/or evidentiary
basis for upholding the trial Court's respective summary judgment
dismissals of each party. Therefore, Posner respectfully requests that this
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Court reverse the trial court's dismissal of Equity because existing factual
disputes should have precluded the grant of summary judgment, reverse the
trial court's findings that Posner's real estate agent acted within her authority
and that Equity breached no duty to Posner, and remand this case for trial.
Posner also requests that for the reasons set forth, this Court find that
the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning Posner by striking his
expert report, which led to the dismissal of his case, and reverse the trial
court's ruling that expert testimony on the standard of care was necessary,
remanding this case for trial. For the reasons stated in his original Brief,
Posner also requests that this Court reverse the trial court's award of
attorney fees under the Listing Agreement.
Dated this 29th day of July, 2009.
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